problems or puzzles? (the purview of philosophy)

I finally read Wittgenstein’s Poker, a book that’s been on my shelf for far too long. What I most liked about it is how readable it is: one does not need any background in philosophy to enjoy the story, which does a nice job detailing the battle of ideas at the introductory level.
The poker incident is presented as a symbolic enactment of the clash in philosophy between two schools of thought: Karl Popper‘s embrace of problem-solving rationalism in the form of a principle of falsification – “I may be wrong and you may be right, and by an effort, we may get nearer the truth” (240) vs Ludwig Wittgenstein‘s linguistically-generated puzzles, “what many in the [Vienna] Circle misunderstood was that Wittgenstein did not believe that the unsayable could be condemned as nonsense. On the contrary, the things we could not talk about were those that really mattered” (158).
These philosophers followed (and to varying extents) diverged from the analytic philosophy of Bertrand Russell.

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