I’m not sure about MacIntyre’s assessment that there are no philosophical innovations after Hegel because changes in social structures could (I imagine) invoke new kinds of relations and thus different orders of morality. This notion is in keeping (?) with Hegel’s emphasis on the dialectic between the specifics of a social situation as a frame that conditions/limits the morality that can emerge.
There’s something about freedom and the negative which lock up in the individual who wants to experiment with virtue. Hegel poo-poos the notion mightily, scoffing at the arrogance of anyone who thinks they can buck the norms of a social group. This is because “what gives a sanction to our moral choices is in part the fact that the criteria which govern our choices are not chosen” (208).
Hence, “the moral life can only be led within a certain type of community, and in…such a community certain values will prove indispensable” (208).
He’s definitely got the western notion of progress firmly in mind – a steady evolution toward something wondrous, with (ethnicized) “freedom” as the lynchpin.